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abstract
By the end of their first year, infants can interpret many different types of
complex dynamic visual events, such as caused-motion, chasing, and goal-
directed action. Infants of this age are also in the early stages of vocabulary
development, producing their first words at around 12 months. The
present work examined whether there are meaningful individual differ-
ences in infants’ ability to represent dynamic causal events in visual
scenes, and whether these differences influence vocabulary development.
As part of the longitudinal Language 0–5 Project, 78 10-month-old
infants were tested on their ability to interpret three dynamic motion
events, involving (a) caused-motion, (b) chasing behaviour, and (c) goal-
directedmovement. Planned analyses found that infants showed evidence
of understanding the first two event types, but not the third. Looking
behaviour in each task was not meaningfully related to vocabulary devel-
opment, nor were there any correlations between the tasks. The results of
additional exploratory analyses and simulations suggested that the
infants’ understanding of each event may not be predictive of their
vocabulary development, and that looking times in these tasks may not
be reliably capturing any meaningful individual differences in their
knowledge. This raises questions about how to convert experimental
group designs to individual differences measures, and how to interpret
infant looking time behaviour.
keywords : causal events, infant perception, vocabulary develop-
ment, individual differences
1. Introduction
There are substantial individual differences in the age and rate at which
children acquire vocabulary. These emerge early and increase in magnitude
over time (e.g., Fenson et al., 1994). Evidence from the Stanford Wordbank
(http://wordbank.stanford.edu) suggests that this variance in vocabulary
acquisition is a cross-linguistic phenomenon (Frank, Braginsky, Yurovsky,
& Marchman, 2017); in 23 different languages, 12-month-olds on the 80th
percentile produce an average of 13words,whereas those on the 20th percentile
produce around 1.23 words. Although many of the children with the smallest
vocabulary sizes at this age will ultimately be diagnosed with a developmental
language disorder, there remain substantial and meaningful developmental
differences among children in the typical range. Understanding the causes of
these differences is a crucial step towards building comprehensive models of
language acquisition. Previous studies of typically developing children have
considered whether individual differences in vocabulary development are the
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result of variance in the children’s environment (e.g., parental input: Hoff,
2006) and cognitive abilities (e.g., speed of linguistic processing: Fernald,
Perfors, & Marchman, 2006; phonological working memory: Gathercole &
Baddeley, 1989; and statistical learning: Kidd, Junge, Spokes, Morrison, &
Cutler, 2018). The aim of the present study was to examine whether the
capacity to understand complex dynamic events in the world is also a contrib-
uting factor by testing these skills at the earliest stages of vocabulary develop-
ment. That is, at 9 to 10 months old, do individual differences in
representations of the conceptual world form part of the explanation for the
variance observed in vocabulary development?
Since the relationship between words and their referents can be seen as
largely arbitrary (Saussure, 1916), it is often assumed that word meaning is
derived from the visual–spatial understanding of events. Mandler (1992)
argued that perceptual analysis is critical in developing meaning representa-
tions that support later language learning. Part of this analysis involves
abstraction from the low-level visual input into higher-level image schemas:
complex relational representations of events (see Figure 1 for an example of
caused motion), which according to cognitive linguistic accounts of linguistic
knowledge are central to language representation (Langacker, 1987; Talmy,
1988) and language acquisition (Tomasello, 2003). Although there is variation
across languages in the visual–spatial components that are expressed in lan-
guage (e.g., Korean verbs distinguish tight/loose fit; Choi &Bowerman, 1991),
many of the visual features that can be expressed in language are present
universally before language acquisition begins (Chang, Choi, & Ko, 2015;
Hespos & Spelke, 2004). Therefore, speakers’ shared understanding of lan-
guage meaningmust be based on some shared non-linguistic understanding of
events, and visual–spatial information appears to be the most likely source.
In this study, we test the idea that, if language meaning depends on the
ability to understand events perceptually, then variation in vocabulary acqui-
sition may depend on variation in visual–spatial event understanding. Since
visual perception is a complex system with many subcomponents (Marr,
1982), it is necessary to restrict our examination of this relationship to a small
set of features. Todo this, we selected three aspects of event understanding that
Fig. 1 An illustration of Michotte’s (1946) launching display.
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have been tested in infants: causality, durational actions, and goal-directed
actions. These components were selected to be as abstract as possible, such that
they could potentially apply to a wide range of words.
The first feature we examined was causality between two entities, which is
critical to distinguish verbs that describe self-generated motion and those that
describe externally caused motion (e.g., “the car moved” vs. “he pushed the
car”). Nouns are also defined in terms of causal features (e.g., a match is a stick
that causes fire when contact is made with another object). Causality is a very
general concept that applies across a range of events, but it ismost easily seen in
scenes of pushing. Research on causality in these types of scenes was pioneered
byMichotte (1946), who tested adult participants on their perception of visual
scenes using launching displays illustrated in Figure 1. In these scenes, shape A
moved directly towards shape B, which was stationary. When shape A made
physical contact with shape B, shape A stopped moving and shape B immedi-
ately moved away along the same trajectory. Viewers reliably interpreted these
sequences as causal events in which shape A launches shape B intomotion, akin
to one billiard ball hitting another, even though these were animated static
images without any causal link in themotion (Hume, 1748). Similar launching
event studies have found that infants can discriminate causal from non-causal
events (Leslie, 1982, 1984; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes, 1994; Oakes &
Cohen, 1990), but that the impression of causality is reduced in adults and
childrenwhen there is no contact between the objects orwhen there is a delay in
the launching of the second object. For example, Oakes and Cohen (1990)
habituated 6- and 10-month-olds to either a causal launch display (Figure 1) or
a non-causal delayed launching or no collision display. They were then shown
novel non-causal or causal displays, respectively. The 10-month-olds, but not
the 6-month-olds, showed a significant increase in looking to the event type
that differed in causality from the event seen during habituation. This suggests
that, by 10 months, infants can distinguish between causal and non-causal
events based on only spatial and temporal characteristics. Importantly, these
looking patterns were not attributable to the novelty of the alternative event;
when habituated to a non-causal event, the infants dishabituated to a novel
causal event but not to a novel non-causal event. According to the authors, this
showed that the infants had identified the similarity in causality status between
the familiar and novel non-causal events.Other studies have shown that infants
as young as 6 months make similar distinctions (Cohen &Amsel, 1998; Leslie,
1984), though, in this case, performance was sensitive to the specific objects
involved in the events (e.g., changing the agent and patient between trials
affected performance; Cohen & Oakes, 1993). Overall, this work suggests that
infants can already understand some of the features used to identify agents and
patients in causal events at the very early stages of language acquisition.
4
event understanding and vocabulary development
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.26
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.124.92.195, on 13 Aug 2020 at 16:33:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
Causal pushing events focus on the brief interaction between objects around
contact, but many events require that children aggregate information over a
period of time. For example, walking and running can only be distinguished by
observing the action over time (running leads to more movement). Likewise,
some noun-referents, like snack andmeal, can be distinguished by the way that
they are performed over time (a meal involves eating over a longer period of
time).Thus, another ability that is important for understandingwordmeaning
is the ability to track objects’ interactions over time. This ability is tapped in
studies of chasing events (Gao,Newman, &Scholl, 2009;Gao&Scholl, 2011),
where participants see identical objects on the screen and must identify the
chaser in the event. Participants do this by tracking the angle of motion of all
the objects relative to the other objects (the chaser moves towards the chasee).
Frankenhuis, House, Barrett, and Johnson (2013) have shown that 4- and
10-month-old infants can distinguish a chasing relationship from a scene with
random motion. By manipulating different aspects of the chasing motion, the
authors showed that the preference for chasing was primarily due to two visual
cues; the acceleration of the patient to “escape” the agent, and the “heat-
seeking” attraction of the agent to the patient. This is consistent with the
findings of other infant studies using an eye-tracking paradigm (Galazka &
Nyström, 2016), and experiments with older children or adult participants
(Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005; Gao et al., 2009; Gao & Scholl, 2011;
Meyerhoff, Papenmeier, Jahn, & Huff, 2013).
Third, and finally, many word meanings are distinguished by observable
physical changes. For example, children come to understand that the word
“try” refers to intending to do something, while the phrase “by accident” is
usedwhen an action was unintentional (Astington, 1986).Work on child social
cognition has found that infants can also usemotion cues to infer the intentions
and goalsmotivating an agent’s behaviour (e.g., Csibra, 2008; Csibra,Gergely,
Bıŕó,Koós, &Brockbank, 1999;Gergely,Nádasdy, Csibra, &Bíró, 1995; Luo,
2011; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004; Woodward, 1998).
Luo (2011) examined whether 3-month-old infants can attribute goals and
preferences to objects that appeared to be inanimate. The infants saw physical
object displays containing a moving box positioned between a cone and a
cylinder. They were familiarised to a scene in which the box repeatedly
approached one of the objects, before being tested on trials where the box
either approached the alternative object or continued to approach the original
object. It was found that infants watched for longer when the box approached
the new object than the old object, even when the location of the target objects
was switched (i.e., when the direction of movement towards the new object
matched the familiarisation trials). Luo suggested that the infants see the box
as having a preference for the old object and hence they were surprised to see it
switch goals.Other research has similarly found that infantswill attribute goals
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and intentions to simple shapes (for a review, see Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian,
2016). Collectively, these studies suggest that the critical feature that triggers
the perception of agency is evidence of internal control, such as when a self-
propelled agent consistently chooses to approach a goal object, even after it has
changed position in the display. Infants also appear to make goal attributions
based on an expectation that agents will act rationally; for example, taking the
shortest available path to reach the goal object (e.g., Csibra et al., 1999;Gergely
et al., 1995).
In sum, infants appear to be capable of using spatial and motion cues to
identify physical causality by 10 months (Oakes & Cohen, 1990), intentional
chasing by 4 months (Frankenhuis et al., 2013), and goal-directed behaviour
by 3months (Luo, 2011). However, it is unclear whether there are meaningful
individual differences in these abilities; that is, whether some children have a
deeper understanding of complex dynamic events or are faster at processing
such visual scenes compared to others of the same age. There is reason to think
that this may be the case since robust individual differences with developmen-
tal implications have been observed in a range of cognitive domains. For
example, rate of habituation (i.e., speed of decrement of attention to a repeat-
edly presented stimulus) and recognition memory (i.e., ability to discriminate
between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli) in infants younger than 1 year have
been reported, and even shown to meaningfully predict IQ in later childhood
(e.g., Bornstein & Sigman, 1986; Kavšek, 2004; McCall & Carriger, 1993).
Yet, Gampe, Keitel, and Daum (2015) observed a lack of individual consis-
tency in infants’ anticipatory looking times when they were regularly tested
between the ages of 7 and 12 months with an action-perception task where an
agent reaches for a ball and drops it into a bucket (see also Melzer, Prinz, &
Daum, 2012). Thus, the first aim of the present work was to test whether there
are meaningful individual differences in the ability of 9- to 10-month-olds to
interpret caused-motion (Oakes & Cohen, 1990), chasing interactions
(Frankenhuis et al., 2013), and goal-directed behaviour (Luo, 2011). Since
all three tasks tap into some aspect of the child’s conceptual understanding, it is
reasonable to assume that we would expect to find correlations across the three
tasks; for example, that children with sophisticated conceptual understanding
in one task (e.g., discriminating causal from non-causal motion events) should
also demonstrate sophisticated conceptual understanding in another
(e.g., discriminating goal-directed from non-goal-directed events).
The three tasks used in the present research used habituation/familiarisation
(in the case of caused-motion and goal-directed behaviour) and preferential
looking (in the case of chasing) designs. Extracting measures of individual
differences in these three tasks presents a methodological challenge. In habit-
uation/familiarisation designs, children are habituated to one stimulus (i.e., a
stimulus is repeatedly presented), before being shown a novel stimulus. In
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preferential looking designs, children are shown two events simultaneously
(e.g., a chasing event vs. random movement). In both designs, the outcome
measure is a looking-time difference analysed at the group level; if the infants,
as a group, tend to look for longer at one event than the other, all infants at that
age are credited with the relevant ability. However, to test for individual
differences, we need to assess the outcome of these tasks at the participant
level. In this study, we used looking-time differences, relying on the assump-
tion that individual looking-time differences are meaningful indicators of an
infant’s ability. This assumption is validated by previous research, which has
observed robust relationships between vocabulary knowledge and looking
times across a range of tasks, including those assessing lexical speed of proces-
sing (Fernald et al., 2006; Lany, 2018), recognition memory (Gathercole &
Baddeley, 1989), statistical learning (Kidd et al., 2018), word segmentation
(Singh, Steven Reznick, & Xuehua, 2012), sentence processing (Mani &
Huettig, 2012), and visual sequence learning (Shafto, Conway, Field, &
Houston, 2012). Note too, that the use of parametric tests to analyse group
behaviour in infant looking-time studies also assumes that individual differ-
ences in looking times directly measure performance. For example, in the
causal motion study of Oakes and Cohen (1990), the statistical tests used rely
on the assumption that a child who dishabituates more (i.e., looks substantially
longer at the novel than the habituated event) not only knows more about
causal motion than a child who does not dishabituate at all, but also knows
more than a childwhoonly dishabituates a little (i.e., only looks a little longer at
the novel event). Thus, for present purposes, looking-time differences are
treated as direct measurements of infants’ event understanding
(to foreshadow the results, thefindings suggest that thismay not be a legitimate
assumption; the implications of this for the interpretation of looking-time
measures more generally are considered further in the ‘General discussion’).
The second aim of the present research was to determine whether infants’
ability to interpret complex events influences their ability to learn new words.
All theories of language acquisition assume that visual–spatial event under-
standing is an important part of language acquisition (Goldin-Meadow &
Mylander, 1998; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Mandler, 1992; Tomasello &
Vaish, 2013). To date, the nature of this relationship has not been tested. In
this work, we examined whether individual differences in looking times on our
three event perception tasks at 9–10 months predicted overall vocabulary size,
and action verb vocabulary size, both concurrently and longitudinally.
In sum, the goal of this study was to determine whether there are individual
differences in infants’ ability to represent dynamic causal events in visual
scenes and whether these differences contribute to individual differences in
vocabulary size. Infants aged between 9 and 10 months took part in three
studies designed to investigate their ability to interpret dynamic causal events;
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a caused-motion event (Oakes & Cohen, 1990), a chasing event (Frankenhuis
et al., 2013), and a goal-directed event (Luo, 2011). Infants were tested at 9–
10 months, since this is the point at which children are starting to learn to
comprehend, if not produce, words. Thus, their ability to learn may be
influenced by their conceptual representations. By the age tested, above-
chance performance at the group level is observed in all three of the original
versions of these tasks. Whilst 9–10 months is an older age than was tested in
the original versions of two of these tasks (goal-directed behaviour and inten-
tional chasing), there is no empirical reason to assume that there will be no
meaningful variation in their understanding at a later time-point. First, we
assessed whether the group effects reported by the original authors could be
replicated. Second, we tested whether looking-time behaviour in these tasks
provided reliable, and correlated, measures of individual differences in ability.
Finally, we examined whether individual differences correlated with concur-
rent and later vocabulary size. The results of our planned analyses are depen-
dent on two critical assumptions about how event knowledge can be measured
in infants. First, it is commonly, and implicitly, assumed that looking times
linearly reflect knowledge, such that longer looking times are indicative of a
deeper understanding of the stimulus. The second assumption is that the type
of looking preference (novelty or familiarity) is meaningful. In a series of
exploratory analyses and simulations, we tested the validity of these assump-
tions.
2. Method
We tested whether 10-month-old infants could interpret dynamic events in
three tasks requiring the attribution of caused-motion, chasing, and goal-
directed action. Data on vocabulary size were collected atmultiple time-points
using parent-completed questionnaires and the full Bayley Scales of Infant and
Toddler Development, Third Edition (BSID-III; Bayley, 2006) was admin-
istered at 16–17 months.
2 .1 . participants
These studies form part of a larger longitudinal project in the northwest of
England called the Language 0–5 Project. Ninety-five typically developing
monolingual participants were recruited to take part at the outset of the project
(see <https://osf.io/wdy7c/>). The three experimental studies presented here
were completed in a single session when the participants were aged between
9 and 10 months. A total of 78 infants (41 females) attended this session (mean
age = 9;24 months, range = 9;12–10;18).
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2 .2 . materials and procedure
For all three studies, infants were seated either in a high-chair (with their
caregiver to their left facing away from the screen) or on their parents’ lap 60cm
away from a widescreen TV (3846  1080). During testing, infants were
allowed a dummy/pacifier or snack if required. Studies were presented using
the Look program (Meints, Plunkett, & Harris, 2008), and controlled by an
experimenter monitoring the infant’s behaviour via a webcam (see Figure 2 for
set-up). In all tasks, trials were initiated by the experimenter when the infant
was looking towards the screen, although there were differences in the dura-
tions the stimuli were presented for and in how trials were terminated (further
details are provided in the next section). These differences between tasks were
maintained to adhere to the original designs as closely as possible. As we were
testing older children than in the original studies and on multiple tasks in a
single session, we aimed to replicate every task as closely as possible so as to
minimise the reasons for any failure to replicate. Each task was presented twice
Fig. 2 Diagram of the laboratory set-up.
9
durrant et al .
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.26
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.124.92.195, on 13 Aug 2020 at 16:33:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
during the session, with presentation order organised into three pairings. All
infants completed the tasks in the same order, with each task presented both in
the first and second position within a pairing. Between pairings, there was a
short play break where infants left the testing booth and played with the
experimenter and their caregiver. The duration of the break between pairings
varied for each infant (M = 10:22 minutes, range = 1:43–22:10 minutes). The
structure of the testing session was as follows:
1. Task 1a and Task 2a
2. Play break
3. Task 3a and Task 1b
4. Play break
5. Task 2b and Task 3b
2.3 . task 1 : distinguishing causal from non-causal
motion
The first task was an adaptation of Oakes and Cohen (1990) used to assess
infants’ ability to distinguish between causal and non-causal events with novel
inanimate objects. Oakes and Cohen presented infants aged 6 and 10 months
with four different scenes of real-world objects interacting in different ways:
two of the videos demonstrated two different non-causal events, one a casual
event, and one a single object control event. There were two phases to each
testing session, a habituation phase and a test phase. In the habituation phase,
infants were shown amaximumof 20 trials displaying either the causal event or
one of the non-causal events. Individual trials terminated if the infant looked
away for 500 milliseconds (ms), and the habituation phase ended when the
infants’ looking time in a block of 4 trials reduced below 50% of the looking
time in the first four trials. Following habituation, all four events were pre-
sented, starting with the habituated event and ending with the control event.
The infants showed an increase in looking to the event type they were not
habituated to. Most importantly for our study, when habituated to a non-
causal event, the infants increased looking to a novel causal event but not a
novel non-causal event.
In the current study, we adapted theOakes andCohen (1990) design in three
ways. First, we presented computer-generated clips of inanimate abstract 3D
shapes instead of videotaped real objects, allowing us to control the character-
istics of the events more carefully. Similar computer-generated stimuli have
been used successfully in previous studies with younger infants (e.g.,
4-month-olds; Schlottmann, Ray, & Surian, 2012). Second, we implemented
a familiarisation procedure in place of habituation. We presented infants with
10
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10 trials, each with a maximum duration of 21 seconds. Trials terminated at
21 seconds or earlier if infants looked away for two seconds continuously.
Third, we ran only one condition, all infants were familiarised to a non-causal
event and then tested on all four event types. In this condition, knowledge of
causality is most clearly observed by increased looking to the novel causal but
not the novel non-causal event.
2.3.1. Visual stimuli
Four event sequences were created based on the description in Oakes and Cohen
(1990). Events were four seconds in duration andwere repeated five times in each
presentation. All sequences began with both objects still on screen for one second
(Figure 3A). Then object A (e.g., yellow cube) moved towards object B (e.g.,
green cylinder) for one second. The movement of object B away from object A
lasted for one second (Figure 3D). The crucial difference between the events
occurred at the mid-point of the sequence. In the direct launching event (causal
event), objects A and B touched and object B immediately moved away from A
(as if pushedbyA;Figure3B). In thedelayed launching event, theobjects touched
for one secondbefore objectBmoved away (non-causal event 1;Figure 3B). In the
indirect launching event, objectAdidnot touchobjectB.ObjectBmoved away as
object A’s movement ended (non-causal event 2; Figure 3C).
Between each sequence, a blank screen was displayed for 200ms. Event clips
were created using Processing 2 software (https://processing.org) and por-
trayed inanimate objects: a yellow cube, green wheel, and a purple hammer
in set one, and a blue cylinder, red ball, and green pyramid in set two. The
Fig. 3 Screenshots of the caused-motion stimuli showing (1) direct causal launching, (2) delayed
non-causal launching, (3) no contact non-causal launching. In the direct launching trials (1),
both objects are shown still on screen for 1 second (A).The first objectmoves towards the second
object and stops upon contact (B); the second object then immediatelymoves away from the first
to the other side of the screen (C) and then pauses for 1 second (D). In the delayed non-causal
trials (2), there is a 1-second pause after contact (B–C). In the no contact trials (3), the objects
never physically connect (C).
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objects in set one always moved from left to right on the screen and the (non-
causal) familiarisation event was indirect launching. The objects in set two
always moved from right to left and the (non-causal) familiarisation event was
delayed launching. Half of the infants saw the set one objects first and half saw
the set two objects first. In individual differences designs it is crucial to
minimise item variance to ensure that any variation is due to differences
between participants.We implemented a reduced counterbalancing procedure
to map onto the counterbalancing in the original design without introducing
too much variation into our individual differences design.
2.3.2. Procedure
Infants were shown 10 familiarisation trials in which a non-causal event was
displayed. Looking duration was recorded online; a button was held down by
an experimenter watching the infant via a webcam for as long as the infant was
attending to the screen. Trials terminated if the infant looked away from the
screen for longer than two consecutive seconds. Following familiarisation
trials, four test trials began. All infants saw the familiarised non-causal event
as the first test trial, followed by the causal event (novel), a new non-causal
event (novel), and finally the single object control event (novel). Each test trial
had a maximum duration of 21 seconds or ended when the infant looked away
from the screen for two seconds continuously.
2 .4 . task 2: distinguishing chasing from random motion
Task 2 was based on the first experiment in Frankenhuis et al. (2013) and was
used to determine whether infants show a preference for chasing interactions
over random movement sequences involving two coloured circles on the
screen. We implemented the multiple cues version of this task, to provide
infants with the most complete example of chasing.
2.4.1. Visual stimuli
The stimuli used in this task were provided by Frankenhuis et al. (2013) and
are identical to the stimuli used in their study one. Each video presented two
discs, one red and one green, for a fixed duration of 20 seconds. In the chasing
video, the discs depicted either the motion of a chaser or of an evader. Both
discs had a turning rate of 5% and there was a 5% probability of changing
direction with each pixel moved. The chaser disc approached the evader at a
constant velocity of .6 pixels per frame in a ‘heat-seeking’manner, reducing the
distance between the two discs. When this distance was within 80 pixels, the
evader would ‘flee’ by increasing to 4 times its baseline speed (.3 pixels per
12
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second) and turn away from the chaser. There were approximately 15 fleeing
episodes per 20-second display. Control videos presented the discs moving
independently. On occasions where the discs came within 60 pixels of each
other, the slower one would change direction but there was no change in
velocity and turning rates were lower (.005%). Thus, the videos differed on
three dimensions: acceleration, turning rate, and attraction (see Figure 4).
2.4.2. Procedure
Infants saw 12 trials in total, 6 in each task pairing. On each trial two videos
were presented simultaneously side by side in front of the infant; one video
depicted random movement (control display) and one chasing movement
(target display). Trials played for a fixed duration of 20 seconds. Between
trials, a smiley face appeared on screen. Trials were coded offline frame-by-
frame (40 frames per second) using Score, part of the Look package (Meints
et al., 2008).
2 .5 . task 3 : identifying goal-directed movement
The third task we used was an adaptation of Luo (2011) to identify whether
infants attribute psychological goals to non-human agents. There were four
phases in the task, each ended when the infant looked away for two seconds
consecutively or the maximum looking time of 60 seconds was reached. In
phase one, infants saw two orientation trials where a single objectmoved across
Fig. 4 Adiagramof the chasing task. Both event types are presented side by side in a preferential
looking task.
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the screen. In phase two, five familiarisation trials involving three objects,
positioned to the right, centre, and left, were presented. The centre object
moved towards one of the other objects and paused on contact until the trial
ended. Phase three showed a still image where the left- and right-positioned
objects were reversed, and the centre stimulus was absent. Phase four consisted
of two test trials. In one, the box moved in the opposite direction to familiar-
isation but towards the same object (old goal event). In the other, the box
moved in the same direction but towards the alternative object (new goal
event). Luo found that infants looked longer to the new goal event than the
old goal event. This was explained as the infants having attributed a psycho-
logical goal to the central object’s movement towards a particular object.
In our version of this task, we followed the same procedure but made two
modifications. First, the familiarisation trials were a fixed duration of eight
seconds. Second, computer-generated on-screen stimuli were used instead of
real object live-action scenes.
2.5.1. Visual stimuli
A series of computer-generated scenes involving shapes were created tomatch,
as closely as possible, the scenes described by Luo (2011). The stimulus set
1 presented a blue cone acting as the agent, a red diamond as the target and a
yellow box as the distracter (Figure 5F), and stimulus set 2 included a green
pyramid as the agent, an orange bowl as the target and a purple cross as the
distractor (Figure 5A–E).
Two orientation trials were created. In the first of these, the ‘agent’ moved
from the left of the screen to the centre and back again. In the second, the
‘agent’ moved from the right of the screen to the centre and back again
(Figure 5A). In both cases, the movement cycle lasted six seconds and was
shown twice, resulting in a total trial duration of 12 seconds. During familiar-
isation trials, all three objects were presentedwith nomovement for one second
before the ‘agent’ moved towards the ‘target’ and away from the ‘distractor’
(Figure 5B). This movement lasted for three seconds. This final frame, with
the ‘agent’ positioned next to the ‘target’, remained on screen for a further four
seconds. The display event presented a still image of the ‘target’ and ‘distrac-
tor’ only, but in switched positions (Figure 5C). Finally, two test trials were
created. In the old goal event, the ‘agent’ moved towards the ‘target’ and
remained there for a maximum of 55 seconds (Figure 5E). In the new goal
event, the ‘agent’ moved towards the ‘distractor’ and remained there for a
maximum of 55 seconds (Figure 5D). In both test trials, the shapes were static
for one second before the movement began, and the movement lasted for three
seconds.
14
event understanding and vocabulary development
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.26
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.124.92.195, on 13 Aug 2020 at 16:33:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
2.5.2. Procedure
Looking times were recorded online via a button held down by an experi-
menter observing the infant via a webcam. Infants were first presented with
two orientation trials.Next, infantswere shownfive familiarisation trialswith a
fixed duration of eight seconds. Display trials followed the familiarisation and
lasted a maximum of 59 seconds, ending when infants looked away for 2 con-
secutive seconds or the maximum duration was reached. Finally, two test
events were presented: in pairing one, the old goal event was presented first,
and in pairing two, the new goal event was presented first. Test events lasted a
maximum of 59 seconds, or until the infant looked away for 2 seconds consec-
utively.
2 .6 . vocabulary measures
The UK-CDI (Alcock, Meints, & Rowland, 2020) was administered at 8, 9,
11, 12, 15, 16, and 18months. TheUK-CDI is a checklist of themost common
gestures and words, which captures UK English-speaking infants’ early com-
municative repertoire and is suitable for use between 9 and 18 months. Care-
givers are asked to select ‘never’, ‘sometimes’, or ‘often’ for gesture items and to
indicate whether their child ‘understands’ or ‘understands and says’ the
vocabulary items (total possible score for both receptive and expressive vocab-
ulary = 396). Caregivers were asked to complete the checklist before the visit,
either via an online link or on a paper form according to their preference. Those
who did not complete it before the visit were given a paper form to complete
Fig. 5 Screenshots of the goals stimuli showing (A) the single object orientation trial, (B) the
familiarisation event, (C) the static display with the objects in different positions, (D) the new
goal trial, (E) the old goal trial, and (F) the static novel object display.
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during the session. The UK-CDI has been standardised for the UK popula-
tion and has good validity and reliability (see Alcock et al., 2020).
2 .7 . cognitive measures
At 16–17 months the BSID-III (Bayley, 2006) was administered. The BSID-
III is made up of five subscales measuring language, cognition, social-
emotional, motor, and adaptive behaviour. The cognitive subscale used here
comprises 91 items that assess sensorimotor development (e.g., squeezing an
object), exploration and manipulation (e.g., finding a hidden object), and
pretend play (e.g., demonstrating relational play with toys). The technical
manual accompanying this test reports a high degree of reliability (average
reliability of .91 for the cognitive scale) and validity (each item within a scale
correlated more strongly with that scale than with other scales). Children are
awarded a 1 for each correctly performed item.
3. Results
3 .1 . group level analyses
In the first of our planned analyses, wewanted to test whether we replicated the
original results in each of the event-understanding tasks. For all three tasks, the
dependent measure was the raw looking times in milliseconds on a continuous
normal distribution. Linear mixed-effects models were fit to the looking times
of each task using the lme4 1.1-21 package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, &Walker,
2015) with the nloptwrap optimizer algorithm in R version 3.6.1 (R Core
Team, 2019). All of the models were initially fitted with the maximal random
effects structure (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) but, if the data were
unable to support the model, random slopes were removed in a predetermined
sequence until convergence was achieved. The highest-order interaction terms
were removed first, starting with those that explained the least amount of
variance. If the model still did not converge once the interactions were
removed, the random slope of block was removed before the random slope of
display type, irrespective of the amount of variance explained by each term, due
to the greater theoretical importance of the latter. All of the statistics for the
three replication models are presented in Table 1, and the final random effect
structure of eachmodel is described in detail below. In addition to themodel fit
statistics, marginal and conditional R2 are reported as effect sizes. These effect
sizes denote the proportion of the variance explained by the model with the
inclusion (conditional R2) and exclusion (marginal R2) of the model random
effect structure (Johnson, 2014; Nakagawa, Johnson, & Schielzeth, 2017;
Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Bootstrap resampling (R = 1000) was used to
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compute 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the model estimates and their
associated p-values (Luke, 2017). The observed effects are illustrated in
Figure 6 and the statistics are reported in Table 1.
For the caused-motion task, display type (familiar non-causal, novel causal,
novel non-causal) was entered as a centred factor with two contrasts. The first
contrast compared looking times for the familiar non-causal trial with the novel
non-causal trials, to test whether the infants defamiliarised to a display with
different spatio-temporal features but the same non-causal status. The second
contrast determined whether the infants defamiliarised to a caused-motion
event, comparing looking times in the familiar non-causal trial to the novel
causal trial. Additionally, block (1/2) was entered as an effect coded factor,
which was crossed with display type to establish whether looking behaviour
changed between the first and second presentations. The maximal model
supported by the data included subject as a random intercept, with the random
slope of the familiar/causal contrast. The outcome of this analysis was consis-
tentwith thefindings ofOakes andCohen (1990); after familiarisation to a non-
causal display, the infants’ looking times increased when presented with a
novel causal display, but not when presented with a novel non-causal display.
Furthermore, while looking times appeared to be higher in block 1 than block
2, there were no interactions between the display contrasts and block,
table 1 The results of the mixed-effect models testing whether the group-level
effects were replicated in the three tasks
Task Term β [95% CI] SE χ2 Pr
Causality (Intercept) 6407 [5780, 7008] 313 NA NA
Familiar vs. Non-Causal –1215 [–2442, 32] 631 0.73 .536
Familiar vs. Causal 1522 [240, 2759] 643 5.61 .015
Block 1 vs. Block 2 –575 [–1019, –122] 229 5.96 .034
Familiar/Non-CausalBlock 1/2 632 [–643, 1918] 653 0.54 .463
Familiar/Causal  Block 1/2 –437 [–1751, 863] 667 0.46 .514
Chasing (Intercept) 5781 [5157, 6423] 323 NA NA
Random vs. Chasing 1269 [899, 1629] 186 43.06 < .001
Block 1 vs. Block 2 –525 [–716, –335] 97 29.55 .001
Random/Chasing  Block 1/2 –238 [–634, 159] 202 1.56 .225
Goals (Intercept) 5720 [5216, 6194] 249 NA NA
Old Goal vs. New Goal 303 [–584, 1182] 451 0.3 .563
Block 1 vs. Block 2 –199 [–655, 260] 233 0.7 .401
Old/New Goal  Block 1/2 536 [–336, 1395] 441 1.41 .250
Causality Model Fit: BIC = 8022, AICc = 7983, R2m = .0291, R
2
c = .1590
Chasing Model Fit: BIC = 32924, AICc = 32886, R2m = .0380, R
2
c = .1598
Goals Model Fit: BIC = 4966, AICc = 4945, R2m = .0089, R
2
c = .0747
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suggesting that the observed group differences in looking times did not vary
between the two presentations.
In the chasing task, display type (chasing vs. non-chasing) and block (1/2)
were included as fully crossed effect coded fixed factors. Since the chasing task
implemented a preferential looking design in which the participants were
presented with both display types concurrently over six independent trials,
trial (1–6)was included as an additional random intercept.Themaximalmodel
that converged included both subject and trial as random intercepts but did not
include random slopes for these terms. Consistent with the results of Fran-
kenhuis et al. (2013), the model showed that the participants looked for longer
at the chasing than the non-chasing display. There was a main effect of block,
reflecting a reduction in overall looking time in block 2.However, there was no
interaction between block and display type, suggesting that the group prefer-
ence for the chasing display was consistent.
Finally, in the goal-directed behaviour task, display type (old goal vs. new
goal) and block (1/2) were entered into the model as fully crossed effect coded
predictors. The random-effects structure supported by the data included
Fig. 6 Pirate plots to show the results of the conceptual task replications.
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subject as a random intercept with the display type contrast as a random slope.
The results did not reproduce the findings of Luo (2011); looking duration for
trials where the agent approached a new goal was not significantly different
from looking duration for trials where it approached the old goal. There was
also no difference in overall looking between blocks 1 and 2, nor was there an
interaction between block and the display condition, suggesting that looking
preferences did not vary between the blocks.
Our version of the goals task made three methodological changes to Luo’s
(2011) original design, whichmay have contributed to the difference in results:
the participants were 6 to 7 months older than the infants tested by Luo
(10 months compared to 2–3 months); we used computer-generated stimuli
rather than live object presentation; and we reduced the duration of the
familiarisation trials from amaximum of 60 seconds to a fixed 8-second period.
To rule out this third change as an explanation for our failure to reproduce
Luo’s result, we ran a closely matched follow-up study with a separate sample
of 26 infants (15 girls) aged 9 to 12 months (Median = 321 days, Range = 274–
369 days). This version used the same stimuli as our first reproduction attempt
but implemented an infant-controlled familiarisation phase closely aligned to
Luo’s procedure. In this version of the task, the familiarisation trials could last
up to 60 seconds. Trials were terminated either when the child looked away for
2 seconds continuously or the maximum duration was reached. The results of
this second experiment did not reproduce Luo’s findings either, but were
consistent with the results of our first task (see online materials at <https://
osf.io/mjv73/>). In Luo’s work, large effect sizes were reported for the differ-
ences in looking times between the newgoal and old goal trials (exp.1:Cohen’s d
= 0.8; exp.2: Cohen’s d = 0.7). Using bootstrap simulations (R = 10000),
confidence intervals were computed for the Cohen’s d observed in our two
reproduction attempts. The observed effect sizes were considerably smaller
and the CIs did not capture the effects reported in Luo’s study (attempt 1:
Cohen’s d = –0.07 [–0.31, 0.18]; attempt 2: Cohen’s d = 0.07 [–0.34, 0.49]). In
sum, it appears that the results of the caused-motion and chasing tasks repro-
duced the group effects reported by the original authors (Frankenhuis et al.,
2013; Oakes & Cohen, 1990) while the goal-directed behaviour task did not
(Luo, 2011).
3 .2 . individual differences and relationships with
vocabulary development
Our second set of planned analyses assessed whether there are meaningful
individual differences in 9- to 10-month-olds’ ability to interpret dynamic
events and whether these differences influence vocabulary development. The
difference in looking times to the target and control displays in each task was
19
durrant et al .
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/langcog.2020.26
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 2.124.92.195, on 13 Aug 2020 at 16:33:42, subject to the Cambridge Core
used as a measure of infants’ understanding. For the caused-motion task, this
was total looking time in the novel causal trial minus total looking time in the
novel non-causal trial. For the chasing task, it was the looking time to the
chasing display minus looking time to the randommovement display. For the
goal-directed behaviour task, it was the total looking time during the new goal
trial minus total looking time in the old goal trial. We performed a series of
Pearson’s correlations that were bootstrapped (R = 10000) to obtain 95%
confidence intervals and accurate p-values. We can infer that there is a mean-
ingful direction-specific relationship between two measures when they pro-
duce a high Pearson’s r coefficient, 95%CIs that do not cross zero, and a low p-
value.
We first examined whether the infants’ performance in block 1 correlated
with their performance in block 2 within each task. These correlations found
no evidence of consistency; all three tasks yielded 95%CIs that crossed zero and
had high p-values (all ps > .217, see Table 2). This suggests that, at the
individual level, the infants responded differently in each presentation of the
three tasks. This lack of consistency may be due to fatigue effects since overall
looking times were lower in the second block for both the caused-motion and
chasing tasks, or to carry-over effects from having seen similar displays, albeit
with different objects, in block 1. It may also be that the looking-time differ-
ence scores were not representative of individual differences in understanding.
It is not possible to disentangle these explanations on the basis of the current
data but, considering these results, all subsequent analyses were performed
using the data from each block separately.
table 2 Looking-time correlations for each task across blocks 1 and 2
x y Pearson’s [95% CI] Df Pr
Within Task Causality 1 Causality 2 .04 [–.18, .28] 56 .526
Chasing1 Chasing 2 –.19 [–.39, .03] 69 .217
Goals 1 Goals 2 –.11 [–.39, .17] 49 .406
Between Tasks Causality 1 Chasing 1 –.26 [–.45, –.02] 66 .116
Causality 1 Chasing 2 .13 [–.12, .40] 65 .350
Causality 1 Goals 1 –.20 [–.44, .05] 61 .226
Causality 1 Goals 2 –.01 [–.21, .21] 50 .587
Chasing1 Goals 1 –.02 [–.24, .17] 62 .565
Chasing1 Goals 2 .10 [–.32, .40] 52 .350
Causality 2 Chasing 1 –.02 [–.35, .18] 57 .509
Causality 2 Chasing 2 –.21 [–.39, .01] 57 .185
Causality 2 Goals 1 –.10 [–.41, .15] 55 .417
Causality 2 Goals 2 –.06 [–.46, .28] 48 .379
Chasing2 Goals 1 –.09 [–.32, .14] 62 .428
Chasing2 Goals 2 .05 [–.17, .30] 52 .529
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Our next analysis tested whether the infants’ looking behaviour was driven
by a common understanding of dynamic events shared between the tasks.
Following the same analytical procedure as above, we tested whether the
infants showed a consistent preference direction and magnitude for the tar-
get/control display across the three tasks. However, these analyses showed no
reliable relationships in looking behaviour in either block (see Table 2). The
infants who, for example, strongly discriminated causal from non-causal
motion events were not the same individuals who demonstrated strong pref-
erences in the chasing or goal-directed behaviour tasks.
Finally, we tested whether the separate abilities measured by the tasks were
related to vocabulary development. The infants’ task difference scores were
combined with three separate measures of vocabulary obtained from the
UK-CDI questionnaire at six different age points (9, 11, 12, 15, 16, and
18 months), total comprehension vocabulary, total productive vocabulary,
and action word comprehension. Correlations were calculated for both the
block 1 and block 2 difference scores following the same procedure as the
previous analyses. The purpose of these correlationswas not to directly test our
hypotheses, but to identify whether a more rigorous confirmatory growth
curve analysis (GCA)wasmerited. This would provide amethod of estimating
change in vocabulary size over time as a function of individual differences in
the looking-time difference scores (Mirman, 2014; Mirman, Dixon, & Mag-
nuson, 2008). Specifically, the correlations served as preliminary checks for
potential relationships in the data to identify the parameters to include in a full
GCA model (e.g., the caused-motion but not the goal-directed behaviour
scores).
However, these correlation analyses found no consistent relationships
between the task and vocabulary measures (see Tables 3 and 4). The strongest
relationships were between the chasing task and the total comprehension and
action word comprehension scores, but the effects occurred in opposite direc-
tions in each block and none of the p-values reached the traditional significance
threshold (cf. McShane, Gal, Gelman, Robert, & Tackett, 2019). One should
also consider that a total of 162 correlations were performed, so approximately
eight correlations with a traditionally significant p-value would be expected to
occur by chance under the null hypothesis. The main implication of these
analyses is that there was no strong evidence of a relationship between vocab-
ulary development and looking-time preferences in the three event perception
tasks.
3 .3 . exploratory analyses and simulations
The present results suggest that visual event understanding at 10 months does
not predict concurrent vocabulary size and ongoing vocabulary development.
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table 3 Pearson’s R [95% CIs] to show the correlations between task
performance in block 1 and the target UK-CDI vocabulary scores
Task Months All Receptive All Expressive Action Receptive
Causality 9 –.15 [–.32, .03] .04 [–.18, .24] –.08 [–.28, .13]
11 –.06 [–.29, .13] .16 [–.04, .34] –.08 [–.30, .11]
12 –.18 [–.48, .03] .06 [–.11, .25] –.19 [–.52, .03]
15 –.06 [–.39, .17] .14 [–.02, .27] –.08 [–.36, .14]
16 –.05 [–.34, .18] .07 [–.19, .26] –.05 [–.30, .17]
18 –.01 [–.26, .23] .02 [–.21, .23] .01 [–.24, .22]
Chasing 9 .19 [.02, .36] –.05 [–.27, .21] .22 [–.03, .35]
11 .23 [.04, .39] –.11 [–.33, .11] .22 [.00, .35]
12 .26 [.05, .45] .07 [–.07, .21] .26 [.09, .45]
15 .07 [–.19, .33] .02 [–.21, .19] .07 [–.15, .31]
16 .01 [–.26, .31] –.04 [–.27, .16] .05 [–.20, .31]
18 –.05 [–.33, .27] –.14 [–.35, .09] –.10 [–.33, .14]
Goals 9 –.06 [–.34, .19] –.09 [–.27, .11] –.11 [–.32, .14]
11 –.00 [–.19, .22] –.02 [–.20, .20] –.01 [–.19, .22]
12 –.06 [–.29, .17] –.03 [–.32, .24] –.08 [–.31, .18]
15 .01 [–.22, .24] .02 [–.17, .20] –.05 [–.28, .18]
16 .04 [–.19, .27] –.02 [–.20, .15] .01 [–.22, .24]
18 –.06 [–.26, .13] .02 [–.18, .22] –.02 [–.23, .17]
* p < .05, *** p < .001
table 4 Pearson’s R [95% CIs] to show the correlations between task
performance in block 2 and the target UK-CDI vocabulary scores
Task Months All Receptive All Expressive Action Receptive
Causality 9 .04 [–.21, .26] .24 [–.03, .44] .10 [–.14, .34]
11 .21 [–.05, .39] .14 [–.12, .32] .20 [–.06, .36]
12 .19 [–.03, .39] .12 [–.08, .27] .22 [–.01, .41]
15 .07 [–.24, .32] .06 [–.15, .24] .02 [–.32, .28]
16 –.01 [–.27, .25] –.03 [–.26, .15] .01 [–.29, .27]
18 .10 [–.14, .33] .01 [–.15, .20] .17 [–.11, .40]
Chasing 9 –.24 [–.53, .08] –.11 [–.45, .19] –.34 [–.57, –.10]
11 –.29 [–.56, .02] –.21 [–.53, .06] –.29 [–.54, .01]
12 –.37 [–.61, –.05] –.18 [–.49, .09] –.32 [–.57, –.01]
15 –.32 [–.56, –.04] –.11 [–.41, .07] –.32 [–.53, –.07]
16 –.25 [–.48, .02] –.17 [–.42, .05] –.23 [–.45, .04]
18 –.21 [–.44, .06] –.18 [–.42, .07] –.21 [–.45, .04]
Goals 9 –.01 [–.20, .15] –.03 [–.25, .17] –.02 [–.21, .15]
11 –.04 [–.29, .13] –.05 [–.28, .16] –.03 [–.30, .15]
12 .00 [–.20, .18] .09 [–.13, .41] .00 [–.20, .23]
15 –.14 [–.37, .09] .03 [–.27, .43] –.10 [–.32, .14]
16 –.04 [–.29, .24] .06 [–.27, .54] –.03 [–.29, .22]
18 .05 [–.27, .34] .10 [–.17, .46] –.02 [–.32, .28]
* p < .05, *** p < .001
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Additional exploratory analyses were performed on the block 1 data for the
caused-motion and chasing tasks. These two datasets were selected since both
tasks replicated the original group-level effects, while also providing examples
from familiarisation and preferential-looking designs. Although the results of
our planned analyses found no evidence of a relationship between vocabulary
size and the understanding of dynamic events, they made two critical assump-
tions about how such knowledge would be expressed. First, it was assumed
that this knowledge exists on an interval scale that is directly expressed through
the infants’ looking times. For example, an infant with an 800ms preference for
the chasing display is considered twice as knowledgeable as an infant with a
400ms preference. The second assumption is that the direction of the prefer-
ence is meaningful; that is, an infant with a 200ms preference for the novel
causal display is treated as havingmore knowledge about caused-motion events
than an infant with a 200ms preference for the novel non-causal display (i.e., a
difference score of –200ms). We tested the validity of these assumptions in a
series of exploratory analyses and simulations.
The first simulation considered whether an individual infant’s dynamic
event understanding should be expressed categorically rather than continu-
ously. The looking-time difference scores calculated for the planned analyses
were used to classify each infant as having either a target display preference
(i.e., longer looking at novel causal or chasing display), a control display
preference (i.e., longer looking at the novel non-causal or random motion
display), or no preference. These categories represented levels on a response
type factor, coded with Helmert contrasts. The first contrast compared the
infants with a target preference to those with a control preference, to explore
whether categorical differences in response direction may predict vocabulary
development.The second contrast pooled the infants showing either a target or
control preference and compared them to the group showing no preference.
This comparison considers whether the infants who make a distinction
between the two display types, regardless of the stimulus they prefer, have a
larger vocabulary size than those who looked at both displays equally.
When converting a continuous variable into a categorical factor, it is neces-
sary to determine the boundaries of each category. To avoid making assump-
tions about where this threshold occurs, we simulated a range of boundaries by
iteratively raising the no-preference limit in looking-time increments repre-
senting 1% of the standard deviation of each sample (caused-motion incre-
ments = 63ms; chasing increments = 24ms). Both the caused-motion and
chasing simulations were initialised with a no-preference upper boundary at
SD  0.05 (i.e., a very small effect size; Sawilowsky, 2009) and terminated at
SD 0.5 (i.e., amedium effect size; Cohen, 1992).With each iteration, separate
bootstrapped linear regression models (r = 1000) were fit to the total compre-
hension scores for each of the six UK-CDI age-points (9, 11, 12, 15, 16, and
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18 months), with the response type factor as a predictor. These simulations
found no evidence that non-linear looking preferences were related to com-
prehension vocabulary; the t-ratios for each contrast were small and inconsis-
tent across the different ages in every iteration (see onlinematerials at <https://
osf.io/mjv73/>).
The second simulation considered the possibility that looking-time differ-
ences are only partially related to vocabulary size; that theremay be a difference
threshold where the relationship diminishes. To explore whether such a
threshold exists, a second simulation iteratively examined the relationship
between looking times and total comprehension vocabulary in participants
who had difference scores below a set threshold. In a similar procedure to the
first simulation, the inclusion limit was incrementally increased by 1% of the
standard deviation for the entire sample, thus more data were included with
each iteration. For both tasks, the simulationswere initialisedwith an inclusion
threshold of SD  0.05 and terminated at SD  2.5. For every iteration,
bootstrapped linear regression models (r = 1000) were fit to the total compre-
hension vocabulary for each of the six assessed ages. Unlike the planned
analyses, preference direction was entered as a separate predictor from the
continuous looking-time scores. Specifically, the absolute value of the infants’
looking times was taken as a measure of their response magnitude, with the
direction of this score representing their stimulus preference as an effect coded
factor. Consistent with the results of thefirst simulation, the analyses produced
no evidence of a threshold; small and variable t-ratios were observed through-
out the analysis (see online materials at <https://osf.io/mjv73/>).
A third simulation assessed whether there was a relationship between
dynamic event understanding and vocabulary development that includes both
linear andnon-linear components.The previous simulation examinedwhether
there is a linear relationship between event understanding and vocabulary that
disappears beyond a certain threshold. This third simulation considered
whether this threshold marks a transition in the relationship from linear to
categorical. Following a similar procedure to the previous simulations, the
switch pointwas incrementally increased by 1%of the standard deviation of the
sample, starting at a threshold of SD  0.2 and terminating at a limit equal to
SD  1. This threshold was used to split the data into linear and non-linear
components. The proportion of the dataset being treated as linear increased as
the simulation progressed.When a difference score exceeded the limit, its value
was replacedwith themean looking time of the data above the threshold. Thus,
all looking behaviour above the threshold was treated as statistically equiva-
lent. No transformations were applied to difference scores that fell below the
threshold. For each iteration, the data were fit with the same bootstrapped
linear regression models as the second simulation (r = 1000), with separate
predictors for difference scores and preference type. Consistent with the
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previous simulations, these analyses found no evidence to support a non-linear
switching point in the relationship between looking times and vocabulary (see
online materials at <https://osf.io/mjv73/>).
We found that 10-month-old infants can distinguish between displays
showing caused-motion or non-causal events, and between chasing interac-
tions and random movement. However, their precise looking behaviour in
these tasks appears to have no meaningful relationships with vocabulary
development (measured by the UK-CDI) or other tasks measuring different
event perception abilities. Given these results, it is possible that looking
behaviour in these familiarisation and preferential looking tasks does not
directly correspond to the infants’ depth of understanding of the stimulus
and is not suitable for measuring individual differences. In our fourth explor-
atory analysis, we considered whether the Pearson’s r coefficients observed in
our planned analyses (see Tables 3 and 4) could be replicated in a simulation
that treated looking times as meaningful effects at the group level, but ran-
domly distributed at the individual level. Consistent with the previous ana-
lyses, only the block 1 data from the caused-motion and chasing tasks were
used. For each iteration, the data were randomly reshuffled at the trial level so
that each participant’s task difference scores no longer corresponded to their
vocabulary scores. By reshuffling the data, we were able to retain the group
effects observed in the replication analyses, while concurrently assessing
whether the individual looking times that produced these effects have a mean-
ingful relationship with vocabulary size. For each of the six UK-CDI age-
points (9, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 18 months), the caused-motion and chasing
difference scores were reshuffled 10,000 times and a Pearson’s correlation was
computed with the mismatched total comprehension scores. This produced a
distribution of Pearson’s r coefficients, which was used to calculate the prob-
ability of the correlations observed in our planned analyses, or larger, under the
hypothesis that looking times were truly random. The outcome of these
simulations (see Figures 7 and 8) suggests that many of these correlations have
a high probability of occurrence under the computed distribution, especially
those for the later assessment ages. Some of the early correlations with the
chasing task showed a low probability but remained possible under the sim-
ulated distribution. Therefore, many of the relationships between looking-
time scores and vocabulary have a medium to high probability of occurrence if
the taskmeasures do not reliably capture anymeaningful individual differences
in the understanding of dynamic events.
The fifth analysis tested whether the problem might lie in the looking-time
measures themselves. Since the looking-time differences used in the analyses
produced no reliable relationships, it is possible that these scores were unsui-
table as measures of individual differences in event understanding. Thus, the
same analytical procedure used in theUK-CDI vocabulary analyses abovewas
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used to examine whether there was a relationship between the looking-time
difference scores extracted from the three visual tasks and the BSID-III
cognitive development subscale administered when the infants were aged
16–17 months, on the basis that an individual’s event understanding might
reasonably be expected to correlate with global cognitive ability. However, no
reliable relationships were observed between the task looking times and cog-
nitive development scores (see Table 5).
Finally, a sixth analysis examined whether an alternative measure derived
from these tasks would bemore reliable. Sincemany studies have reported that
the rate of habituation is stable within individuals over time (e.g., Bornstein &
Benasich, 1986; Colombo, Mitchell, Coldren, & Freeseman, 1991; McCall &
Carriger, 1993), the infants’ total looking times during the familiarisation
stages of the caused-motion and goal-directed behaviour tasks were calculated
and correlated across blocks 1 and 2within each task. The scores for each block
were then individually correlated with the three measures of vocabulary size
(total comprehension, total production, and action words) at all six assessment
age-points. There was no evidence of individual consistency within each task,
nor were there any notable relationships with vocabulary (see online materials
at <https://osf.io/mjv73/>), suggesting that the absence of individual
Fig. 7 Histograms of the correlation coefficients computed in the causality random reshuffle
simulation. The dashed lines represent the observed correlation coefficients with their p-values
based on the generated distribution.
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differences effects in the present work cannot be attributed to the specific
measures entered into these analyses.
4. General discussion
Most theories of language acquisition assume that visual–spatial perceptual
processing is important for constructing shared language meaning (Goldin-
Meadow & Mylander, 1998; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993; Mandler, 1992;
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Without this ability, there would be nothing to
Fig. 8 Histograms of the correlation coefficients computed in the chasing random reshuffle
simulation, with dashed lines to show the observed correlation coefficients and their p-values on
the simulated distribution.
table 5 Correlations between task performance and Bayley cognitive
development scores at 16 months
Block Task Pearson’s [95% CI] Df Pr
1 Causality .16 [–.14, .42] 62 .293
Chasing –.13 [–.44, .15] 63 .337
Goals –.02 [–.25, .29] 60 .473
2 Causality –.19 [–.51, .08] 52 .285
Chasing .13 [–.20, .39] 61 .344
Goals .02 [–.31, .37] 46 .434
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ensure that the meaning of “chase”was similar across individuals. The goal of
the present research was to examine this assumption using a longitudinal
individual differences design. We tested whether there were meaningful indi-
vidual differences in the ability of 9- to 10-month-old infants to interpret three
dynamic events, and whether these differences influenced vocabulary acquisi-
tion. Ours is the first study to explicitly test the relationship between concep-
tual development and language acquisition at the age when language is starting
to be learned by children (i.e., just before their first birthday), and in multiple
conceptual understanding tasks.
Analysis one was a conceptual replication of three tasks that assessed
dynamic event understanding. Our 9- to 10-month-olds could distinguish
between causal and non-causal movement, consistent with the findings of
Oakes and Cohen (1990) and others (Leslie & Keeble, 1987). They also
demonstrated a preference for chasing events over a concurrently presented
display showing randommovement, consistent with Frankenhuis et al. (2013).
In contrast, across two experiments, we found no evidence that 9- to
10-month-olds infer object preferences in the movement of abstract shapes
(Luo, 2011). There are two potential explanations for this discrepancy. One is
the age difference; Luo tested 2- and 3-month-olds, so our 9- to 10-month-olds
may have found the task too easy and extracted the relevant information from
the scenes very quickly. This is likely to mean that the looking times do not
reflect their knowledge. The second explanation concerns the stimuli.We used
on-screen animated objects, which showed movement with a smooth consis-
tent velocity. Luo used physical objects in a wooden box display, with the
central agent controlled by a human experimenter. It is possible that human
experimenters unconsciously varied the speed of motion of the objects, which
could create a greater impression of animacy, helping the infants to interpret
the behaviour as goal-directed. Further work is needed to address these issues.
Our second and third set of analyses tested whether there were reliable and
correlated individual differences in looking behaviour across the three tasks,
and whether these differences were related to vocabulary size. We observed no
consistency in individual performance on the same task at the two time-points,
no relationships in looking behaviour between the three different tasks, and nor
was there any evidence of a link between task performance and vocabulary or
cognitive ability. Although the failure to observe consistency across the two
time-points (blocks) might be explained by fatigue (due to the duration of the
session) or transfer effects (since the infants watched similar displays, albeit
with different objects, in both blocks), this cannot adequately explain the
failure to find a relationship across tasks, or with vocabulary. The looking
times in the secondblock of each taskwere shorter; however, the overall pattern
of results was consistent. The group effects were present in both blocks and the
relationships with language and between tasks were absent. Our exploratory
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analyses confirmed the absence of such meaningful relationships in our data.
Weused statistical simulations to consider different explanations aboutwhywe
might have failed to observe relationships between vocabulary development
and our looking-time measures: first, that knowledge of causal relationships is
categorical; second, that themagnitude of the difference and not its direction is
reflecting knowledge; third, that there is a threshold beyond which knowledge
is no longer captured by looking-time differences; and finally, that the rela-
tionship is non-linear or has non-linear components. We found no evidence of
any relationships between these tasks and language development within any of
our simulations. Indeed, our fourth simulation revealed that our findings were
highly probable on a distribution of Pearson’s r coefficients computed by
randomly shuffling the infants’ looking times and correlating them with
vocabulary. In our fifth exploratory analysis, we determined if the individual
looking times derived from the tasks relate to global cognitive ability. If such a
relationship with cognitive development had been observed, this would have
provided clear evidence that the looking-time measures we were using had
indeed captured variation in infants’ knowledge of direct causality, agency, and
intention. However, since we did not observe any relationships, using looking
times from these tasks as measures of knowledge may be inappropriate. Thus,
in our sixth and final exploratory analysis, we tested whether another measure
would provide more reliable individual level scores: infants’ total looking time
during familiarisation. There was no change in the pattern of results.
Considering the cumulative findings of these analyses, there are three pos-
sible explanations for the present results. The first is that looking-time differ-
ences in these tasks are meaningful, but each is capturing a different ability, so
we fail to see relationships between these tasks. The second, not mutually
exclusive, explanation is that looking times are meaningful but these abilities
have no effect on children’s vocabulary learning. On this account, although
children do need to be able to interpret events to learn the associatedwords, the
necessary knowledge has already been acquired by the earliest agewemeasured
their vocabulary (i.e., 9–10 months). However, a third explanation is that
looking-time differences are not a reliable measure of an individual infant’s
understanding. We consider this final explanation to be the most plausible, in
the light of the results of our a priori and exploratory analyses.
This conclusion raises broader questions about how to use looking times as a
measure of individual variation (see Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2017). One
question concerns experimental design. To find a group effect, we need to
minimise between-subject variance, but to capture individual differences, we
need high between-subject variance (Hedge et al., 2017). Thus, the very
methodological decisions that lead to success in group designs may reduce
our chances of identifying meaningful individual differences. Furthermore, it
should be noted that in the caused-motion and goal-directed behaviour tasks,
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the looking-time differences were derived from a single trial of each display
(e.g., novel causal vs. novel non-causal). Prior work that has found relation-
ships between looking-time measures and other aspects of development (e.g.,
IQ;McCall & Carriger, 1993) have used measures over multiple presentations
of the same stimuli. Thus, those looking times may be less influenced by
attentional and environmental factors than the ones used in these analyses.
That said, the chasing task and our exploratory analyses using rate of famil-
iarisation both calculated individual differences aggregated over multiple tri-
als. Still, neither of these produced evidence of relationships within the tasks,
between the tasks, or with vocabulary.
Another question concerns the age of testing. For infants to demonstrate
success in a group design, most of the group need to show an effect in the
predicted direction. However, in an individual differences design, we are
looking for the highest variance possible, which may be when group perfor-
mance is at chance. Thus, at the age at which we find group effects, individual
variance may no longer be large enough to measure meaningful differences in
performance. In our case, if we had tested infants younger than 9–10months of
age, and managed to capture the transitionary period of the development of
causal understanding, individual differences might have emerged.
A third question concerns the fact that we know very little about the
underlying drivers of looking behaviour in these tasks, which means it is
difficult to make predictions on an individual level. Looking-time difference
measures are based on the premise that children with a more mature under-
standing of dynamic events will show bigger looking differences (i.e., will look
for substantially longer at one event than the other) than those with immature
or emerging knowledge.Yet, an infantwith amoremature understandingmay,
in fact, extract the relevant information in the events quickly, and then spend
the rest of the time looking at both displays. Alternatively, an infant with an
immature or emerging concept of causality may take longer to extract relevant
information, and thus may explore one scene more than the other. In other
words, the underlying strategies that drive looking-time behaviour may not
yield the expected results. Much more work is needed to understand the
relationship between looking-time behaviour and the knowledge and processes
that drive this behaviour in infants.
5. Conclusion
In summary, we successfully replicated the results of two of the three tasks:
Oakes andCohen’s caused-motion task andFrankenhuis’ chasing task, but not
Luo’s goal-directed behaviour task. Planned analyses revealed no relationships
between these tasks orwith vocabulary size. Exploratory analyses also foundno
relationship with a measure of cognitive development. Simulations explored
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four explanations and converged on a consensus that there were no relation-
ships with language within our data. These findings raise important questions
about how to convert experimental group designs into individual differences
designs, and how to interpret infant looking-time behaviour. We propose that
differences in infants’ ability to interpret dynamic events at 9–10months of age
are not causally implicated in explaining individual variation in vocabulary
acquisition, at least in typically developing children.
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